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INTRODUCTION

In 2012, Gawker Media, LLC' anonymously received a video that
showed Hulk Hogan2 engaging in private sexual conduct with a woman
named Heather Clem.I Gawker then published a brief excerpt from the video
with an accompanying piece written by Gawker's editor. Hogan subsequently
brought an action against Clem, a resident of Florida, and Gawker Media,
LLC, a resident of New York, in Florida state court,4 arguing that Gawker
violated his privacy in publishing the excerpt and that Clem violated his
privacy in taping the encounter without his permission.' Gawker immediately
removed the case to federal court, premising jurisdiction on diversity and
arguing that Hogan had fraudulently joined Heather Clem, also a Florida
resident, to defeat diversity jurisdiction.6 The federal court remanded the case
back to Florida state court, finding that that the plaintiff only had to show that
there was the possibility he could state a valid cause of action against the nondiverse defendant in order to demonstrate that the joinder was not
fraudulent.'
Media reports commented on how this decision would affect the narrative
of the case. Politico reported:
'At the time of the lawsuit, Gawker had more than 250 employees across seven different
internet sites, which were dedicated to sports, feminism, politics, and gadgets, among other things.
It had a track record of producing controversial scoops. It was majority owned by Mr. Denton, its
founder, and took outside investment for the first time specifically to secure funds for this lawsuit.
Ravi Somaiya, Hulk Hogan v. Gawker: A Guide to the Trialfor the Perplexed, N.Y. TIMES (March
17, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/business/media/hulk-hogan-v-gawker-a-guide-to-thetrial-for-the-perplexed.html.
2Hulk Hogan, whose real name is Terry Bollea, is a professional wrestling champion, actor,
and television personality. Id.
3
Heather Clem was married to Bollea's best friend, Todd Clem, a radio "shock-jock" who
legally changed his name to "Bubba the Love Sponge." Gawker Media, LLC. v. Bollea, 170 So. 3d
125, 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Somaiya, supra note 1.
4
Bollea initially included Mr. Clem in the lawsuit on the grounds that Mr. Clem had secretly
filmed him. Mr. Clem was dropped from the lawsuit when he and Bollea settled for a sum of $5,000
and Mr. Clem allegedly promised to testify for Bollea. Tom Kludt, Why Hulk Hogan Settled for
$5,000 with the Man Who Made His Sex Tape, CNN (Mar. 12, 2016), www.money.cnn.com/2016/
03/12/media/hulk-hogan-gawker-settlement/index.html; Somaiya, supra note 1.
1Bollea asserted five causes of action against Heather Clem: (1) invasion of privacy by
intrusion upon seclusion; (2) publication of private facts; (3) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (5) violation of Section 934.10 of the
Florida statutes. Bollea v. Clem, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2013).

'Id. at 1348.
7

Id. at 1350.
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There's a very real possibility that Gawker will lose the
jury trial. The jury, drawn from Hogan's hometown, will
likely be more sympathetic to the wrestler than to a
Manhattan media gossip blog. Gawker ... writes for openminded, media-savvy millennials. The Pinellas County, Fla.,
jury is not the site's target audience.'
And that was completely right-on March 18, 2016, the Florida state
court jury found Gawker liable to Hulk Hogan for $115 million in
compensatory damages, and $25 million more in punitive damages.9
Ultimately Gawker had to dissolve in order to pay the damages. 1
As every first-year law student learns, the plaintiff is the master of her
complaint." She chooses the cause(s) of action, the forum, the timing of the
litigation, and the parties involved. One of those decisions can be the choice
between the federal and state courts. Despite the deference given to the
plaintiff in making this decision, if the plaintiff chooses state court, a
defendant retains the right to remove the case to federal court if it could have
been brought there initially.12
Once a plaintiff has decided to bring her case in state court, she has an
incentive to ensure that the lawsuit stays in state court. At the very least,
empirical studies have shown that plaintiffs suffer a drop in win rates after a
case has been removed to federal court." Because of the strict requirements

8
Peter Sterne, Gawker in the Fight of its Life with Hulk Hogan Sex-Tape Suit, POLITICO (June
12, 2015), www.politico.com/medialstory/2015/06/gawker-in-the-fight-of-its-life-with-hulk-hogan
-sex-tape-suit-004004.
9
Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 522012CA012447, 2016 WL 4073660 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June
8, 2016); Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to Gawker's Bill in Hulk Hogan Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/business/media/hulk-hogan-damages-25million-gawker-case.html.
"oSydney Ember, Gawker.com to Shut Down Next Week, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016),
www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/business/media/gawkercom-to-shut-down-next-week.html.
"Jeffrey L. Roether, InterpretingCongressionalSilence: CAFA JurisdictionalBurden ofProof
in Post-Removal Remand Proceedings,75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2745, 2748 (2007).
1228 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) ("[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.").
"Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything
About the Legal System? Win Rates andRemoval Jurisdiction,83 CORNELL L. REv. 581, 593 (1998)
("Plaintiffs' win rates in removed cases are very low, compared to cases brought originally in federal

4

BAYLOR LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 70: 1

of diversity jurisdiction and removal, a plaintiff has various ways to
appropriately prevent removal. The plaintiff can choose to bring the action
against a non-diverse defendant, or can file the action in the defendant's home
state. The plaintiff can also join with another plaintiff who shares citizenship
with the defendant. 14
What happens, however, if a plaintiff goes beyond her permitted
discretion and joins parties who lack a stake in the suit specifically in order
to prevent removal? While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a
federal court to sever dispensable, non-diverse parties to preserve diversity
jurisdiction in some circumstances, it is discretionary, and courts generally
only look at the plaintiffs complaint to determine if severability is
warranted.'" In addition, severing non-diverse parties does not address the
situation where a plaintiff initiallyjoins a sham party to destroy diversity and,
therefore, defeat removal.
The court-created fraudulent joinder doctrine permits the federal court to
ignore the inclusion of a non-diverse party who would otherwise destroy
federal diversity jurisdiction when the court concludes that the party's j oinder
is a sham.' 6 The doctrine is typically applied in cases where the removing
diverse defendant accuses the plaintiff of fraudulently joining a non-diverse
co-defendant, as in the situation where Gawker accused Hogan of
fraudulently adding Heather Clem as a defendant.'" The doctrine was
originally discussed in a series of Supreme Court opinions, but has not been
addressed by the Court in many years. As a result, the lower courts have

court and to state cases. For example, our data reveal that the win rate in original diversity cases is
71%, but in removed diversity cases it is only 34%.").
1428 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012).
15
FED. R. Civ. P. 21 ("[T]he court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court
may also sever any claim against a party." (emphasis added)). Under Rule 21, federal courts have
immense discretion to either sever dispensable non-diverse parties to preserve diversity jurisdiction
or to allow the lawsuit to continue. Under the fraudulent joinder doctrine, federal courts may "ignore
the presence of a diversity-destroying defendant if the plaintiff has no legitimate cause of action
against the defendant." Matthew C. Monahan, De-Frauding the System: Sham Plaintiffs and the
FraudulentJoinderDoctrine, 110 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1343-44 (2012).
'"For other articles discussing this issue, see generally E. Farish Percy, Making a FederalCase
oflt: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court Based on FraudulentJoinder, 91 IOWA L. REv. 189
(2005) [hereinafter Percy, FederalCase]. See also James M. Underwood, From Proxy to Principle:
Fraudulent Joinder Reconsidered, 69 ALB. L. REv. 1013, 1025 (2006) [hereinafter Underwood,
Proxy to Principle]; Walter Simons, Comment, Choice of Law in FraudulentJoinderLitigation,
163 U. PA. L. REv. 603,609 (2015).
"Bollea v. Clem, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2013).

2018]

HOGAN VS. GA WKER H

5

developed different standards to determine whether a defendant has been
fraudulently joined. 8
This has led to several problems. First, the various standards lead to
inconsistent results, and none of the tests address the possible fraudulent
joinder of a co-plaintiff.19 Second, while the various tests reaffirm that the
presence of a non-diverse party eliminates the local bias that is the primary
rationale for diversity jurisdiction, they ignore the risk of prejudice against
the outsider defendant, like Gawker, which is not eliminated by the presence
of a local co-party. In remanding the Gawker case back to state court, the
federal court emphasized the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, which is to
protect the plaintiff from local favoritism towards the defendant.20 It pointed
out that because Clem was a local Florida resident as well and was on the
defendant's side of the "v," that would balance any favoritism off.21 That
conclusion ignores the risk of prejudice against the defendant outsider
(Gawker) as opposed to bias towards the local plaintiff (Hogan), which is not
eliminated by the presence of a local co-party. The potential prejudice to the
outsider defendant is exacerbated when there is a disparity in the regard in
which locals are held in the community, such as the situation where one side
is more famous and "local" than the other. And it is exacerbated when the
outsider-defendant is the real target of the action, the deep pocket.
This Article will first review the intersection of federal jurisdiction and
litigation strategy by examining the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in
federal court as well as the circumstances that must be present to allow a
defendant to remove a case from state court to federal court. The Article will
then review the history of the court-created doctrine of fraudulent joinder,
and will examine the various tests currently in use by the lower federal courts.
The Article will then address whether it makes more sense to create a
statutory solution, and will examine and analyze the Fraudulent Joinder
Prevention Act of 2016, which was recently passed by the House of
Representatives.2 2 After analyzing the Act, this Article will conclude that,
"See infra notes 79-81.
"For an in-depth discussion of the joinder of sham co-plaintiffs as opposed to sham defendants,
see Monahan, supra note 15, at 1341.
20
See Bollea, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 1349.
21 Id.
22

For a recent article that also critiques the Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act, see Percy,
FraudulentJoinderPreventionAct, infra note 142, at 218-19. For an article in favor of the Act, see
Arthur D. Hellman, The FraudulentJoinder Prevention Act of 2016: A New Standard and a New
Rationalefor an Old Doctrine, 17 FEDERALIST SOC'Y. REv. 34, 43 (2016).
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while a statutory solution to this issue is appropriate, the current proposal
needs to be adjusted in various ways.
I.

THE INTERSECTION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
LITIGATION STRATEGY

A. Diversity Jurisdiction
The grant of subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is found in
the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] ... between
Citizens of different states . .. " Congress has the constitutional authority
to decide by statute how much of the federal subject matter jurisdiction under
Article III shall be vested in the lower courts.24 Congress cannot give the
lower courts more subject matter jurisdiction than the Constitution allows,
but it can give them less. The federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions that involve a federal question,2 5 while the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000 and
where the lawsuit is between citizens of different states. 2 6 The Supreme Court
has held that this diversity requirement must be construed as complete
diversity, meaning that that no party may share citizenship with any opposing
party. 27

There has been a continued debate over the continued need for diversity
jurisdiction. Traditionally, the arguments in favor of diversity are that it
protects out-of-state litigants from local bias, it motivates judicial reform, and
it allows cross pollination between the federal courts and the state courts. 28
23 U.S. CONST. art. III,
24 U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 2.
§ 1.

2528 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
26
1d. § 1332(a)(1).
27Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806) (announcing the requirement of complete
diversity).
21
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553-54 (2005) ("[T]he
purpose of the diversity requirement . . is to provide a federal forum for important disputes where
state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state litigants."); see also Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) ("Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order
to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the state."); JoHN
J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 260, 261 (8th ed. 2001) ("The most
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There have been many proposals to abolish or curtail diversity jurisdiction
on the basis that it creates docket congestion, there is no longer local
prejudice against out-of-state defendants, and because there is no longer a
difference in the law being applied 29 in the state and federal courts, the risk
of different outcomes no longer exists.30 W/ile it continues to exist, there are
more and more limits to its use. 3

common explanation for the creation of diversity jurisdiction was a fear that state courts would be
prejudiced against out-of-state parties."); Graham C. Lilly, Making Sense of Nonsense: Reforming
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 181, 190 (1998) ("The principal argument for diversity
jurisdiction is to protect out of state litigants from local prejudice.").
29
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins abolished general federal common law. 304 U.S. at 78 ("Exceptin matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the State . . . [t]here is no federal general common law."). Under the Erie
doctrine, if there is no federal directive on point, the federal court must determine if the issue is
substantive or procedural. If the issue is substantive, the federal court will use the law of the state
in which the federal court sits. If the issue is procedural, the federal court will use federal law.
Because cases dealing with a substantive issue use the law of the state in which the federal court
sits, rather than a federal common law, the courts are able to achieve equitable results and avoid
forum shopping. See id. at 64. When the Erie doctrine abolished federal common law in 1938,
disparate treatment of out-of-state litigants largely diminished. Because of this, many people wish
to abolish diversity jurisdiction. See James M. Underwood, The Late, GreatDiversity Jurisdiction,
57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 198 (2006) ("This Court will not conceal its disaffection for the
notion that federal jurisdiction over disputes between citizens of different States is necessary to
protect out-of-State parties from local prejudice. State judges, no less than federal judges are
obligated to provide a neutral forum. Moreover, State judges, in comparison to federal judges, are
more likely to have competence, experience, and expertise in tort, contract, and real estate
litigation .... " (quoting Thompson v. Gillen, 491 F. Supp. 24, 26 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1980))); see also
Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REv. 97, 98 (1990).
30
Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 119, 120
n.5, 143 (2003) ("Every administration since President Carter's, the Judicial Conference, the
American Law Institute, state courts, numerous public interest and legal aid organizations, and most
scholars support the abolition or curtailment of diversity." (quoting Kramer, supra note 29, at 98);
Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs' Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject
Matter Jurisdiction,59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 57 (2009) ("In reality, a case does not receive the same
treatment or have the same chance of success in federal court as it does in state court, especially
when local plaintiffs sue large, out-of-state corporations.") (citing Note, Forum Shopping
Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1677, 1677-78 (1990)).
3 For example, the amount in controversy continues to increase, the requirements of citizenship
require that a person be both a citizen of a state and of the United States, and the requirements of
domicile. See Jurisdiction:Diversity, Federal Judicial Center, https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/
jurisdiction-diversity (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
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B. Removal
Even if a plaintiff has chosen to bring the action in a competent state
court, removal allows a defendant to elect to remove the case to federal
court.32 The concept of removal is a bit anomalous because it gives the
defendant, already sued in a court of competent jurisdiction, the right to elect
his own forum. While the Constitution does not expressly authorize removal
jurisdiction, it has existed since the Judiciary Act of 1789.33 In Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, the Court upheld the constitutionality of removal
jurisdiction, finding that the judicial power of the United States was not
intended to be "exercised exclusively for the benefit of parties who might be
plaintiffs," but was also for the protection of defendants who might want to
appear before a federal forum.34
In order for the defendant to be able to remove, the federal court must
have had original jurisdiction over the case had it initially been filed in federal
court.35 While a case can be removed if the federal court has original
jurisdiction either through federal question or through diversity, the cases
involving fraudulent joinder generally involve diversity.36 If original
jurisdiction is based on diversity, there can be no removal if any of the
defendants are citizens of the state where the lawsuit has been brought.3 ' The
rationale for that is that there is no potential prejudice against that defendant
in the state court forum.3 8
3228 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
"See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the JudiciaryAct of] 789, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 1499, 1518 (1990) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9-13, 1 Stat. 73).
34 14 U.S. 304, 348 (1816).
3528 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
36
E. Farish Percy, Defining the Contours ofthe Emerging FraudulentMisjoinder Doctrine, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 569, 606 (2006) [hereinafter Percy, Defining the Contours] ("The
traditional fraudulent joinder doctrine is typically applied in cases where the removing diverse
defendant accuses the plaintiff of fraudulently joining a non-diverse defendant.").
1728 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012) ("A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of
the jurisdiction under [S]ection 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.").
38
GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., 718 F.3d 615, 625 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Codified under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b)(2), the forum defendant rule prohibits removal 'if any parties in interest properly joined
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.' The purpose of
this rule is 'to preserve the plaintiffs choice of a (state) forum, under circumstances where it is
arguably less urgent to provide a federal forum to prevent prejudice against an out-of-state party."'
(quoting Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., 222 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2000))); Reimold v. Gokaslan,
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The process for removal is controlled by the federal court.3 9 The
defendant files a petition for removal with the federal court. The case is then
removed. If one of the parties believes that the case was improperly removed,
she can move to remand the case back to state court. 40 There is no appeal
from the federal court's decision to remand the case back to state court. 4 1
C. Litigation Strategy
In many cases, determining the appropriate forum for a lawsuit is "the
most important strategic decision a party makes in a lawsuit." 42 Both
plaintiffs and defendants recognize the importance of these rules to litigation
strategy. Generally, plaintiffs prefer to litigate in state court and defendants
prefer to litigate in federal court for a variety of reasons, including differences
in procedural rules and the general perception among litigants that state court
judges are more favorable to plaintiffs and federal judges are more favorable
to defendants.43 In one study, the authors found that the plaintiff had a 71%
chance of winning a case brought in state court, and if a case was removed to
federal court, that rate decreased to 34%." As a result, many plaintiffs file in
state court and fight removal, while many defendants have a strong incentive
to try to remove the case to federal court.
The doctrine of fraudulent joinder involves the intersection of litigation
strategy and jurisdictional rules. For example, a plaintiff-oriented practice
guide states that a creative counsel can attempt to state a tenable claim against
110 F. Supp. 3d 641, 642-43 (D. Md. 2015) ("[The forum defendant rule] recognizes that there is
no need to protect out-of-state defendants from local prejudice 'where the defendant is a citizen of
the state in which the case is brought."' (quoting Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 940
(9th Cir. 2006))).
39

See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
1Id. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.").
41If the district court erroneously remands a case on the ground that there was no fraudulent
joinder, the error cannot be corrected because 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) prohibits the review of remand
orders. Heilman, supra note 22, at 36.
42
Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 55; Simons, supra note 16, at 608.
43
Simons, supra note 16, at 608 n.21 (quoting Percy, FederalCase, supra note 16, at 205-06
& n. 110); Heather R. Barber, Developments in the Law: FederalJurisdictionand Forum Selection:
Removal and Remand, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1555, 1558 (2004).
"Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 593. The availability of summary judgment, the
possibility of separating the trial into liability and damages phases, the increased role of the federal
judge in the discovery process, and the federal evidentiary rules may all be more favorable to
defendants.
40

10
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a non-diverse defendant in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction.4 5 A defenseoriented practice guide warns that fighting fraudulent joinder requires
substantial preparation and can seriously raise litigation costs.4 6 A plaintiff's
incentive to "fraudulently join" a non-diverse defendant or co-plaintiff is
clear-that party destroys complete diversity and ensures that the lawsuit will
stay in state court. The development of the fraudulent joinder doctrine is a
court-created response to this kind of strategy-it allows the diverse
defendant to remove by enabling the federal court to ignore the non-diverse
defendant when the court determines that the joinder of that non-diverse
defendant was a sham.47
In the Hulk Hogan case, the plaintiff, Hulk Hogan (Bollea), originally
brought a lawsuit against Gawker for invasion of privacy in federal court,
seeking an injunction to stop Gawker from publishing excerpts of the video
and the accompanying article.48 That injunction was ultimately denied on the
grounds that Gawker was protected under the First Amendment. 49
Simultaneously, Bollea brought an action for defamation against Bubba Clem
and Heather Clem in Florida state court.o Shortly after the injunction was
denied, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, dropping Bubba Clem and
adding Gawker Media, LLC."'
Bollea was well-known in the area where the lawsuit was filed; he grew
up in Tampa and then moved to Clearwater, which was only a few miles from
St. Petersburg.52 As stated in one news article, "Gawker's brand of New York
media snark [was] mostly unknown in St. Petersburg, a small city on the Gulf
45

HelIman, supra note 22, at 36 (quoting DAVID S. CASEY, JR. & JEREMY ROBINSON,

LITIGATING TORT CASES
46

§ 7.7

(2014)).

1d. (quoting Jay S. Blumenkopf et al., FightingFraudulentJoinder: Proving the Impossible
and Preserving Your Corporate Client's Right to a Federal Forum, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 297,
310 (2000)).
47
Underwood, Proxy to Principle,supra note 16, at 1018.
48 Nathaniel McAlone, Everything You Need to Know About the Hulk Hogan Sex-Tape Lawsuit
That Could Cost Gawker over $115 Million, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2016), http://
www.businessinsider.com/hulk-hogan-versus-gawker-lawsuit-explained-2016-3;
Bollea
v.
Gawker, No. 8:12-cv-02348-T-27TBM, 2012 WL 5509624, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012).
49
Bollea, 2012 WL 5509624, at *5.
soComplaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 1, 3, Bollea v. Clem, No. 12012447Cl-01 1, 2012 WL
4887744 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 2012).
5 First Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Bollea v. Clem, No. 12012447, 2012
WL 10731694 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 28, 2012).
52
HULK HOGAN, MY LIFE OUTSIDE THE RING 11 (St. Martin's Press ed., 2009),
https://www.biography.com/people/hulk-hogan-9542305.
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Coast across the bay from Tampa."" During voir dire, the vast majority of
potential jurors stated that they had not heard of Gawker.54 In the plaintiff's
closing arguments, Bollea's attorney reminded the jurors that Gawker's
offices are located on "Fifth Avenue" and that its benefactors are "in New
York sitting behind a computer and playing God with other people's lives.""
In a recent documentary on the case, a journalist stated:
You have a Florida jury that's more accustomed to Terry
Bollea, [who] we know as Hulk Hogan, as a hometown star.
And a kind of disdain for these guys tromping in from the
media capital of the world, thinking they can just play with
someone's life as though he's just a character on the

screen. 56
And finally, the judge in the case, appointed by Jeb Bush, had previously
been the lawyer for the parents of Terri Schiavo, who refused to allow
Schiavo's feeding tube to be removed.5 ' As the trial began, the judge
commented to the jury that she was unhappy with the state ofjournalism, and
especially online journalism. 58
Clearly, Bollea strategically chose state court-and a specific state
court-for his lawsuit. He was well known there; the jury was sympathetic
towards him and suspicious of the media and Manhattan. Similarly, Gawker
had a strong incentive to try to remove the case to federal court, as it faced a
judge and jury who distrusted online journalism and northern "big city"
corporations. The issue to be explored is how the federal court should
determine whether Heather Clem was a sham defendant whose sole purpose
was to defeat removal jurisdiction.

Peter Sterne, Jury Awards Hulk Hogan $115 Million as Gawker Looks to Appeal, POLITICO
(Mar. 18, 2016), www.politico.com/media/story/2016/03/jury-awards-hulk-hogan-I 15-million-asgawker-looks-to-appeal-004433.
54

id.

55

1d.
56
NOBODY SPEAK: TRIALS OF FREE PRESS (Luminant Media 2017).
57Id.

58

1d.
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11. THE FRAUDULENT JOINDER STANDARD
A. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court first articulated the idea of fraudulent joinder in the
early 1900s and has not revisited the doctrine since the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were adopted in 1938.59 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
lower courts have grappled with the concept, creating conflicts among the
circuits with respect to both the standard for determining when a claim is
fraudulently joined and the process for evaluating whether fraudulent joinder
exists.60 Nevertheless, the early Supreme Court decisions provide the basis
for those various interpretations and assist in understanding and evaluating
the modem approaches to the issue.
The Supreme Court has generally been resistant to the defendant's
attempts to alter the structure of the plaintiffs lawsuit." In Plymouth Gold
Mining Co. v. Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., the defendants argued that
removal to federal court was proper because their non-diverse co-parties were
"sham defendants" whose only purpose was to defeat removal.62 The Court
found that because the complaint alleged a facially legitimate cause of action
against all of the defendants, the complaining defendant bore the burden of

59

The last case where the Supreme Court addressed allegations of fraudulent joinder is Wilson

v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92 (1921).
'See infra notes 80-87.
61 During this same period of time,

&

the Supreme Court also developed the
"voluntary/involuntary rule," an important corollary to fraudulent joinder. Underwood, Proxy to
Principle, supra note 16, at 1021 n.36. The Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff voluntarily
discontinues her action against a non-diverse defendant (through, for example, a settlement or a
decision not to pursue that defendant), the remaining diverse defendant may then remove the case.
See Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1898). If there is an involuntary
dismissal of a non-diverse party (through, for example, the court's action against the wish of the
plaintiff), the case cannot be removed by the remaining diverse defendant. See Whitcomb v.
Smithson, 175 U.S. 635, 638 (1900). Over the next several years, the Court repeatedly applied this
rule. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 281 (1918); Am. Car & Foundry Co. v.
Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311, 317 (1915); Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr.
Improvement Co., 215 U. S. 246, 251 (1909); Kan. City Suburban Belt Ry. Co. v. Herman, 187 U.
S. 63, 70 (1902). While the Court did not clearly articulate the rationale behind the rule, one rationale
is that it furthers judicial economy because if the case is reversed on appeal, it does not have to be
sent back to state court because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The other rationale, which is
more applicable to the fraudulent joinder rule, is that it supports the Court's view that the plaintiff
has great deference in choosing the forum and in preventing removal to federal court.
62118 U.S. 264, 268 (1886).
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establishing that the cause of action was fraudulent-a burden it was unable
to satisfy.6 3 In Alabama Great Southern Railway Co. v. Thompson,' the
Court reiterated that the question of removability must be decided based on
the plaintiffs pleadings at the time of removal and that a defendant's
argument that liability is several does not alter the plaintiffs case.6 ' The
plaintiff has the right to pursue the defendants jointly even if the defendants
could have been sued separately. 66 The Court did recognize, however, that if
a plaintiff "attempts to commit a fraud upon the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts . . the Federal courts may and should take such action as will defeat
attempts to wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in the Federal courts of
the protection of their rights in those tribunals." 67
In 1907, a resident of Missouri brought an action against his diverse
employer and two non-diverse employees in state court.6 ' The defendant
employer filed to remove the case to federal court, alleging that one codefendant was actually diverse from the plaintiff and that the other was
fraudulently joined. 69 Relying on affidavits, the Supreme Court determined
that there was fraudulent joinder and allowed the removal. 70 The Court
further established that a defendant could defeat a remand motion by
claiming that a party was fraudulently joined in Wilson v. Republic Iron
Steel Co., when it held that "[a defendant's] right of removal cannot be
defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant having no real
connection with the controversy." 7 ' Thus, the Court clearly recognized the
doctrine of fraudulent joinder.
Two years later, in Illinois CentralRailroadCo. v. Sheegog, the plaintiff
brought a wrongful death action against one diverse and one non-diverse

6

1 d. at 270-71.

'See Simons, supra note 16, at 610, 610 n.28 (citing Ala. Great S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200
U.S. 206, 215 (1906)) (plaintiff has the right to choose who to sue, but the courts may address
allegations of bad faith by the plaintiff).
6
'Ala. Great S. Ry. Co., 200 U.S. at 216; Simons, supra note 16, at 610 ("The Court explained
that the question of removability must be decided based on the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of
removal . . . .").
66
Ala. Great S. Ry. Co., 200 U.S. at 214-15.
67
Id. at 218.
68
Wecker v. Nat'1 Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 178 (1907). This is the first case
where the actual issue involved fraudulent joinder.
"Id at 180.
7
old at 186.

7'257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921).
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defendant. 72 The diverse defendant argued that the plaintiff had fraudulently
joined the other defendant to defeat removal.73 Because state law imposed
joint liability on the non-diverse defendant for the liability of the diverse
defendant, the Court held that the plaintiff had the right to bring the action
against both defendants. 74 The Court reiterated that where there is a
reasonable basis for the plaintiffs joinder, it does not matter what the
plaintiffs actual motive was, and that allegations of fraudulent joinder
without proper support do not establish fraudulent joinder. 76 Thus, while the
Supreme Court's guidance on this issue ended almost 100 years ago, 7 7 we
know that the basis of the inquiry begins with the assumption that the
plaintiff s joinder of the non-diverse defendant is legitimate, and the burden
of proving fraudulent joinder is on the removing defendant. "Merely to
traverse the allegations upon which the liability of the resident defendant is
rested, or to apply the epithet 'fraudulent' to the joinder, will not suffice: the
showing must be such as compels the conclusion that the joinder is without
right and made in bad faith."
B. The Lower Courts
1. The Standard
All of the lower courts agree that the party (who is usually the codefendant) asserting fraudulent joinder bears the burden of proof,79 and that
72215
73

U.S. 308, 315 (1909).

74

Id.

Id. at 318.
1d.
76
1d. at 316.
77
Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921) (the Court stated that the
removing defendant has the burden to prove that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the co-defendant).
78
See Simons, supra note 16, at 611-12 (discussing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell,
232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914)).
"Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) ("To establish fraudulent
joinder, the removing party has the burden of proving that either: (1) there is no possibility the
plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has
fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts to bring the resident defendant into state court." (quoting
Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997))); Samanta v. Harwer, 226 F. App'x 775,
776 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The removing defendant bears the burden of proving that removal is
appropriate and is entitled to present facts showing that the joinder is fraudulent."); Nerad v.
AstraZeneca Pharms., Inc., 203 F. App'x 911, 912 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[Defendant] failed to carry its
'heavy' burden of demonstrating fraudulent joinder."); Godsey v. Miller, 9 F. App'x 380, 383 (6th
75
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actual fraud-e.g., a plaintiff colluding with a non-diverse defendant to
defeat removal-is sufficient to demonstrate fraudulent joinder.80
The more difficult and common basis for fraudulent joinder is the
scenario that was presented in the Hulk Hogan case, when the diverse
defendant is asserting that no cause of action exists against the non-diverse
defendant and that the only reason that the plaintiff brought an action against
that non-diverse defendant is to defeat removal. The lower courts have
developed different articulations of what the removing party's burden of
proof is." Under the most stringent test, the removing party must

Cir. 2001) ("[T]he removing defendant may avoid remand only by demonstrating that the nondiverse party was fraudulently joined."); Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2000)
("The removing party has the burden of proving the claimed fraud." (quoting Dodson v. Spiliada
Maritime Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1992))); Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851
(3d Cir. 1992) ("The removing party carries a 'heavy burden of persuasion."'); Poulos v. Naas
Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1992) ("An out-of-state defendant who wants to remove must
bear a heavy burden to establish fraudulent joinder."); Leonard v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 75 F.2d 390,
395 (8th Cir. 1935) ("The burden of showing fraudulent joinder is on the party who relies on the
existence of such joinder to support the removal of the action."); Simons, supra note 16, at 614 n.53
("The defendant seeking removal bears a heavy burden of proving fraudulent joinder." (quoting
Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459,461 (2d Cir. 1998))); id. at 614 ("The party alleging
fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden-it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim
even after resolving all issues of law and fact in plaintiffs favor." (quoting Hartley v. CSX Transp.,
187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999))).
soDutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2013) ("To establish fraudulent joinder,
the removing party must demonstrate either: (1) actual fraud in the pleading ofjurisdictional facts,
or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state
court."); Bounds v. Pine Belt Mental Health Care Res., 593 F.3d 209, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[T]here
is improper joinder where (1) there is actual fraud in pleading jurisdictional facts . . . ."); Hunter v.
Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The court explained that there are 'two
ways to establish improper joinder: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or
(2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state
court."' (quoting Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir. 2003))); Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss
Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 763 n.9 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Actual fraud in alleging jurisdictional facts will
suffice to invoke the doctrine."); Travis, 326 F.3d at 647 ("Fraudulent joinder can be established
[by] actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts."); Batoff 977 F.2d at 851 ("Joinder is
fraudulent 'where there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim
against the joined defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the
defendants or seek a joint judgement."' (quoting Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111
(3d Cir. 1990))).
8! There are variations within all of these tests, and some commentators have determined there
are four or even five tests. See Matthew J. Richardson, Clarifying and Limiting FraudulentJoinder,
58 FLA. L. REv. 119, 146-47 (2006) (two standards); Underwood, Proxy to Principle, supra note
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demonstrate that there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to
establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court. 82 The
Tenth Circuit has stated that "this standard is more exacting than that for
dismissing a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); indeed, the latter entails
the kind of merits determination that, absent fraudulent joinder, should be left
to the state court where the action was commenced."83 Similarly, the Third
Circuit has stated that "a claim which can be dismissed only after an intricate
analysis of state law is not so wholly insubstantial and frivolous that it may
be disregarded for purposes of diversity jurisdiction." 84
In Nerad v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals,the Tenth Circuit articulated a
different burden of proof, stating that the court must decide whether there is
a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff might succeed in at least one
claim against the non-diverse defendant."s The court explained that
reasonable basis does not mean a sure thing, but there must be a basis in the
alleged facts and the applicable law.86 The Fifth Circuit recognized the
inconsistencies, stating that "neither our circuit nor other circuits have been
clear in describing the fraudulent joinder standard. The test has been stated
by this court in various terms, even within the same opinion."" Some

16, at 1013, 1022 (three standards); Percy, Defining the Contours, supra note 36, at 609 (four
standards).
82
Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 66 n.80 (noting that "[t]he United States Courts of Appeal for
the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all adopted the
'No Possibility' Test" (citing Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2001)));
Montano v. Allstate Indemn., No. 99-2225, 2000 WL 525592, at *4-5 (10th Cir. April 14, 2000);
Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538; Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1994);
Gottlieb v. Westin Hotel Co., 990 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1993); Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111; AIDS
Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir. 1990); B.,
Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Simons, supra note 16, at
613-14; Hartley, 187 F.3d at 424 ("To show fraudulent joinder, the removing party must
demonstrate either 'outright fraud in the plaintiffs pleading ofjurisdictional facts' or that 'there is
no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state
defendant in state court."' (quoting Marshall, 6 F.3d at 232)); Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc.,
261 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2001); Hart, 199 F.3d at 246 ("To prove fraudulent joinder [removing
parties] must demonstrate that there is no possibility that [plaintiff] would be able to establish a
cause of action against them in state court.").
83
Montano, 2000 WL 525592, at *2.
"Batoff, 977 F.2d at 853.
11203 F. App'x 911, 913 (10th Cir. 2006).
86
Id.
7

See Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 64 n.73 ("The test has been stated by this court in various
terms, even within the same opinion." (quoting Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003))).
1

2018]

HOGAN VS. GA WKER H

17

commentators have opined that while "absolutely no possibility" and "no
reasonable basis" appear to be different tests, they are meant to be equivalent
because each is presented as a restatement of the other."
It can be argued, however, that those two tests are quite different. If the
removing defendant must prove that there was no reasonable basis at the time
the complaint was filed for the plaintiffs claim against the non-diverse
defendant, the test is focusing on the plaintiffs ability to state a cause of
action.89 If the test is "absolutely no possibility," the removing defendant
must prove that there is no possible way for the plaintiff to recover from the
non-diverse defendant.9 0 This standard focuses on the likelihood that the
plaintiff can ultimately recover, rather than the plaintiffs ability to state a

In Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1999), the court stated that "the
removing party must prove . . that there is absolutely no possibility that the plaintiff will be able
to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state court." Later on in the
opinion, the court stated, "stated differently, we must determine whether there is any reasonable
basis for predicting that [the plaintiff] might be able to establish the [non-diverse defendant's]
liability on the pleaded claims in state court." Id.
" Travis, 326 F.3d at 647. Under either test, the sole concern is whether, as a matter of law, the
plaintiff has alleged a valid state law cause of action against the non-diverse defendant. Thus, in a
fraudulent joinder inquiry, federal courts do not weigh the merits of the plaintiFs claim beyond
determining whether the claim is arguable under state law. 16 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice § 107.14[2][c][iv][A] (3d ed. 2011); De La Rosa v. Reliable, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1135,
1161 (D.N.M. 2015).
"See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools, Corp., 913 F. 2d 108, 110 (3d Cir. 1990); Smoot v. Chi., Rock
Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1967) (court uses "allegations are without
factual basis and a complete sham" instead of reasonable cause of action); Percy, FederalCase,
supra note 16, at 216-19; see also Underwood, Proxy to Principle,supra note 16, at 1066-67 (court
uses "colorable cause of action" instead of reasonable cause of action (quoting Jerome-Duncan, Inc.
v. Auto-by-Tel, LLC, 176 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1999))); Monahan, supra note 15, at 1361 n.131
("Looking to the pleadings to determine if there is no 'reasonable basis in fact and law supporting
a claim."' (quoting Filla v. Norfolk & S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003))).
"See Sanchez v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1241 (C.D. Cal. 2015) ("[T]he
removing party must prove that there is absolutely no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to
establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court. . . ." (quoting Green v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1983))); Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp.
3d 1225, 1253 (D.N.M. 2014) ("To establish that a non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently
joined to defeat diversity, the removing party must prove that there is absolutely no possibility that
the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state."
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Burden v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1995)));
see also Hartley v. CSX Transp., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999); Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998); Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997).
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claim.9 1It is a difficult standard for the removing defendant to overcome; she
must demonstrate that there is no possibility that the plaintiff can ultimately
recover from the non-diverse defendant even after resolving all issues of law
and fact in the plaintiff's favor. 9 2
There are some courts that state that the removing defendant must prove
that there is no reasonable possibility that the plaintiff will recover from the
non-diverse defendant. 9 While this test uses the reasonable language instead
of no possibility, it also arguably involves an analysis of the plaintiffs
ultimate recovery from the non-diverse defendant.94 Of the three tests, this is
the one that is the most generous to the removing defendant; the defendant
has to demonstrate that the possibility of the plaintiff ultimately recovering
is not reasonable, rather than having to show that there is no possibility of
recovery.9 5

In the Hulk Hogan case, the district court held that "to establish fraudulent
joinder, Gawker ha[d] the 'heavy' burden of 'proving by clear and
convincing evidence' that (1) there [was] no possibility that Bollea [could]
9

'See Sanchez, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1241; Aguayo, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1253; Gray v. Beverly
Enters. Miss., Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 409 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[I]n the context of fraudulent joinder analysis
a party may not rely on the allegations in his pleadings on their face, but must show that there is, at
minimum, some reasonable dispute of a fact that, if established, would demonstrate a reasonable
possibility of recovery."); Great Plains Trust Co., v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d
305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he Court determines whether that party has any possibility of recovery
against the party whose joinder is questioned. If there is 'arguably any reasonable basis for
predicting that the state law might impose liability on the facts involved', then there is no fraudulent
joinder." (citation omitted)); Parks v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1962)
("[W]e take the rule to be that there can be no fraudulent joinder unless it be clear that there can be
no recovery under the law of the state on the cause alleged, or on the facts in view of the law as they
exist when the petition to remand is heard.").
92
Hartley, 187 F.3d at 424.
93

See Thompson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 760 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2014); Universal
Truck & Equip. Co. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc. 765 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2014); Gray, 390 F.3d
at 405; Sea World, LLC v. Seafarers, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 167, 171 (D.P.R. 2016) (quoting Poulos
v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir. 1992)); Rosbeck v. Corin Grp., PLC, 140 F. Supp. 3d
197, 201 (D. Mass. 2015); Mihok v. Medtronic, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 22, 34, 34 n.7 (D. Conn.
2015); In re Fresenius Granuflo/Naturalyte Dialysate Prods. Liab. Litig., 111 F. Supp. 3d 79, 83 (D.
Mass. 2015).
94
See Percy, Defining the Contours, supra note 36, at 580 n.57 ("The 'no possibility of
recovery' and the 'no reasonable possibility of recovery' tests encourage district courts to evaluate
the likelihood of the plaintiffs success on the merits."); Hellman, supranote 22, at 43 ("If the court
says the plaintiff has 'no possibility' of recovery from the in-state defendant, that is addressing the
merits of the claim.").
95
Gray, 390 F.3d at 405.
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establish a cause of action against Heather Clem. . . ."9 Gawker argued that
Hogan could not establish a cause of action against Clem because each of the
five claims was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 97 The court
rejected this argument, finding that there were not enough facts alleged in the
complaint to evaluate whether one of the claims, publication of the video,
was time-barred.9 8 The court stated that "if one of Bollea's claims [withstood]
the statute of limitations inquiry, then Gawker's first argument for fraudulent
joinder [would] fail[]." 99 Gawker also argued that the causes of action against
Heather Clem were without merit and so egregious that they constituted
fraudulent joinder. 0o The court found that the plaintiff does not have to have
a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant, just a possibility
of stating a valid cause of action.'o' Thus, the court used the standard that
was the most difficult for Gawker to satisfy. 102 It also determined that joinder
was appropriate under Rule 20(a)(2), as there were questions of law and fact
common to both Clem and Gawker, including questions about the video's
chain of custody, Hogan's privacy rights, and the interpretation of Florida's
tort law.1 03 Therefore, the case was remanded back to state court.'"

96

Bollea v. Clem, 937 F. Supp. 1344, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
1d. at 1349-50.
98
Id. See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs. & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment CSX Transp.
N. Lines v. CSX Transp. Inc., 522 F.3d 1190, 1194 (1lth Cir. 2008) (dismissal based on statute of
limitations is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is timebarred).
7

"Bollea, 937 F. Supp. 2d. at 1349.
1oold.
.1 Id. at 1350. Gawker also argued that joinder was inappropriate under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 20(a)(2), but the court found that there were questions of law and fact common to Heather
Clem and Gawker, thus joinder was appropriate. Finally, Gawker argued jurisdiction based on
federal question, which the court also rejected.
02
1 id.
' 031d. at 1351; see also id. at 1351-55 (Unable to establish diversity jurisdiction by fraudulent
joinder, Gawker had to prove federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Gawker argued
two bases for federal question jurisdiction. First, Bollea's claims of invasion of privacy arose under
the United States Constitution. Second, Bollea's request for transferring to Plaintiff all of
Defendant's right, title and interest in and to the video were governed by the United States Copyright
Act. The Court held that no federal questions appeared on the face of the complaint because Bollea's
claims did not arise under the United States Constitution, and his claims were qualitatively different
than claims for copyright infringement.).
"Id. at 1356.
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2. Application of the Standard
No matter what standard a circuit uses, the larger problem arises when
the lower courts attempt to apply the standard. Almost all courts examine the
factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve any
uncertainties in the substantive law in favor of the plaintiff." IWhile most
courts have found the analysis similar to the analysis used when ruling on a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, 0 6 others have stated that
"the proceeding appropriate for resolving a claim of fraudulent joinder is
similar to that used for ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(b)."'0o Some courts caution that while it is up to the district
court to determine the procedure, piercing the pleadings is only appropriate
to identify the presence of discrete facts that would preclude plaintiff's
recovery against the in-state defendant.' As a result, while all courts seem
to allow some extrinsic evidence to determine whether the plaintiffs claim
is legitimate, some only allow the court to examine the pleadings,' 09 and
others will also look at supporting affidavits. "0 The Fifth Circuit has

osSee Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997).
" Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1992) (fraudulent joinder inquiry
is less exacting than 12(b)(6)); Balboa v. Turismo Americanos, LLC, No. EP-03-CA-533(KC), 2004
WL 569521, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2004) (fraudulent joinder inquiry is more exacting than
12(b)(6)); see also Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 71 n. 108 (stating that "while courts have attempted
to clearly restate the fraudulent joinder standard . . . [i]t is difficult to identify the distinction
between the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) and some of the earlier-cited formulations of the
fraudulent-joinder inquiry" (citing Davis v. Prentiss Prop. Ltd., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115-16 (C.D.
Cal. 1999))); Underwood, Proxy to Principle, supra note 16, at 1081 n.349 (a fraudulent joinder
analysis is "similar to that employed in deciding motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)" (citing
Archuleta v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CV 00-1286 MMM (SHX), 2000 WL 656808, at *1, *11 (C.D.
Cal. May 12, 2000))).
07
Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538 (citation omitted). While this inquiry resembles the standard used
for summary judgment, courts have been careful to note that the standard applied to the fraudulent
joinder question should be closer to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Balboa, 2004 WL 569521, at *4.
osSmallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004).
`o Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 934 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Simons,
supranote 16, at 615 ("All circuit courts allow district courts to look at extrinsic evidence to decide
the fraudulent joinder issue. However, courts disagree on the extent to which this evidence can be
used. Although the law allows district courts to consider extrinsic evidence, some will nonetheless
confine their review to the plaintiff s complaint at the time of removal. Other courts will review the
plaintiff's complaint first, and then look to relevant affidavits to determine if there exist[s] sufficient
facts suggesting a possibility of recovery against the alleged fraudulently joined defendant.").
"oPampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998).
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permitted review of the pleadings, affidavits, and deposition testimony."'
Again, courts have cautioned that proceeding beyond this summary process
carries the risk of moving the court beyond jurisdiction and into a resolution
of the merits of the case. 112 No court has adopted a test that analyzes
plaintiffs subjective motive. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's
initial guidance that a plaintiff s motive in joining a non-diverse defendant is
irrelevant.l" 3
Each of these methods has its own issues. Fraudulent joinder is uniquely
problematic because, while its analysis involves a determination of subject
matter jurisdiction, it also requires courts to examine the merits of the
claim.' 14 There is a tension between protecting diverse defendants' right to
remove and ensuring that the federal courts do not exceed their statutory
jurisdiction."' If the allegation is that the plaintiff has no reasonable factual
basis for the claim against the non-diverse defendant, then the federal court
must confront the balance between determining jurisdiction and resolving the
case on its merits.'16
As a result, federal courts may not weigh the merits of a plaintiff's claim
beyond deciding whether it is possible under state law." 7 Whether the
allegation is that the plaintiffs cause of action against the non-diverse
defendant does not exist under state law, or that plaintiffs complaint does
not contain the facts necessary to support a cause of action, the federal court
must confront issues of conflict of laws and substantive state law."' Those

B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981).
" 2 Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 574; Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3rd Cir.
1990); Percy, Federal Case, supra note 16, at 193 (noting that "federal courts evaluating allegations
of fraudulent joinder must walk a fine line between appropriately exercising jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction and inappropriately determining the merits of a case which lacks complete
diversity"); Richardson, supra note 81, at 143-44.
"'Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189 (1931); 111. Cent. R.R Co. v.
Sheegog, 215 U.S. 308, 315 (1909).
4
1l See Percy, FederalCase, supra note 16, at 193 ("[F]ederal courts evaluating allegations of
fraudulent joinder must walk a fine line between appropriately exercising jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction and inappropriately determining the merits of a case which lacks complete diversity.").
5

Id.
116 1d.
"

7

'I d. at 195.
"'The involvement of the federal courts in predicting state law raises federalism concerns
because it requires the federal courts to make policy considerations that the Constitution reserved
to the states. Id. at 202. In order to keep federalism in check, the federal courts have the ongoing
duty to inquire into the basis of their jurisdiction over the subject matter presented to them for
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courts that have used the standard for motions to dismiss under 12(b)(6) must
also consider the impact of the recent Supreme Court cases Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly" 9 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.120 Until 2007, the standard for a
12(b)(6) motion was that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. 12 ' In 2007,
the Supreme Court departed from that standard, requiring plaintiffs to plead
facts with enough particularity that they give rise to a plausible theory of
recovery.1 22
Courts that have analyzed fraudulent joinder since 2007 have not applied
the heightened pleading standard.1 23 While there are some courts that have
used that standard when analyzing motions to dismiss on cases that were
originally filed in state court and properly removed to federal court,'1 24 Courts
have not used that standard to analyze whether the case should be remanded
back to state court. The courts' rationale for rejecting that standard is that the
purpose of the fraudulent joinder standard is to determine whether the state

adjudication. Therefore, fraudulent joinder doctrines that allow federal courts to weigh the merits
of the plaintiffs claim risk violating federalism by encouraging the district courts to review matters
before they determine that they have subject matter jurisdiction. Richardson, supra note 81, at 17475.
" 9 See 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
0
12 See 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009).
21
1 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).
22 There is a substantial body of scholarship on the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on motions to
dismiss. The results have been mixed. There is one study that found no significant change in the
willingness of courts to dismiss cases after Twombly. William H.J. Hubbard, Testingfor Change in
ProceduralStandards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 57
(2013). Another study found that there was a significant increase in dismissals of employment
discrimination and civil rights cases after Iqbal. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of
PlausibilityPleading, 101 VA. L. REv. 2117, 2122 (2015). It is important to note, however, that
most civil rights and employment discrimination cases come into federal court through federal
question subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore would not be privy to fraudulent joinder.
23
1 See Murphy v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 11-2750, 2012 WL 1045443, at *4 (D. Minn.
Jan. 12, 2012), rev'd, 699 F.3d 1027, 1032 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Tofighbakhsh v. Wells Fargo
& Co., No. 10-830 SC, 2010 WL 2486413, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2010); Mendenall v.
Walterboro Veneer Inc., No. 2:1 1-CV-01291-DCN, 2011 WL 6012415, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 1,2011);
Jordan v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., No. 2:07CV66KS-MTP, 2007 WL 1521521, at *2 (S.D. Miss.
May 22, 2007); Solomon v. Sims, No. 4:07-CV-1324-RBH, 2007 WL 2080516, at *1 (D.S.C. July

16, 2007).
24

1 Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 704 (4th Cir. 2015); Casias v. Wal-Mart
Stores,

Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2012).
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court, and not the federal court, may permit the plaintiff to proceed with her
claims against the non-diverse defendant.1 25
In the Hulk Hogan case, the court looked only at the complaint. 126 Citing
Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., the court held that Gawker ha[d] the "heavy
burden" of "proving by clear and convincing evidence" that there was no
possibility that Bollea could establish a cause of action against Heather
Clem.' 2 7 Because the First Amended Complaint asserted a claim against
Heather Clem for the publication of the video, and there were no allegations
regarding the date of the publication, the court determined that there was at
least a possibility that the claim fell within the statute of limitations.128
III. TIME FOR A STATUTE
A. Why a Statute and not Case Law
Despite the conflicts among the circuits regarding both the fraudulent
joinder standard and the process of applying the standard, it is unlikely that
the Supreme Court will ever address and clarify the law for several reasons.
First, if the district court remands a case after removal, that determination is
not reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).1 29 Therefore, there is no direct
way for the issue to get to the Supreme Court. If the district court denies the
motion to remand and allows removal, appellate review is possible, but only
once there is a final judgment.' 30 And "after final judgment in a removed case
that is not remanded, only the most disappointed and dogged of parties would
have sufficient incentive to pursue this threshold issue." 31 At the same time,
fraudulent joinder litigation has been increasing, and in many cases is a
prominent part of complex tort litigation, especially in the areas of products
liability and pharmaceutical litigation.' 3 2 Thus, there continues to be a need
for a consistent standard.

25
1 Edwea, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. H-10-2970, 2010 WL 5099607, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
8, 2010).
26
1 Bollea v. Clem, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
127

1d. at 1349.

128

ld
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1 Hellman, supra note 22, at 36.

"Old. at 39.

' Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316 n.3 (D. Mass. 2013).
132
See Percy, FederalCase, supra note 16, at 192.
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Over the last 25 years, there has been a significant statutory expansion of
federal jurisdiction. In 1990, Congress codified supplemental jurisdiction;13 3
in 2002 Congress passed the Multi-Party Jurisdiction Statute, which broadens
diversity jurisdiction over mass tort state law claims that arise out of a single
occurrence and result in the death of at least 75 people; 1 34 and in 2005,
Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act, which provides for diversity
jurisdiction over state law class action claims with minimal diversity and an
aggregate amount in controversy of at least $5 million.' 3 1 Congress passed
the Class Action Fairness Act because it believed that many state courts could
not be trusted to fairly litigate national class actions.1 36 Despite
recommendations from the Federal Courts Study Committee, which
recommended that Congress eliminate diversity jurisdiction completely,' 37
this recent activity seems to demonstrate a willingness by Congress to expand
diversity jurisdiction.
While the conflict could be resolved through the continued creation and
revision of precedents, it makes more sense to resolve this issue through
legislation. While there is certainly value in the efficiency and predictability
of judge-made rules,' 3 8 it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will reach this
decision in the near future. Given the increase in fraudulent joinder litigation
and the additional confusion as a result of the change in the standards for

'328 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) ("In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy.").
34
' Id. § 1369(a) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident, where at
least 75 natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete location if: (1) a defendant resides in
a State and a substantial part of the accident took place in another State or location, regardless of
whether that defendant is also a resident of a resident of the State where a substantial part of the
accident took place; (2) any two defendants reside in different States, regardless of such defendants
are also resident of the same State or States; or (3) substantial part of the accident took place in
different States.").
'35 Id. § 1332(d)(2)(a). The bill passed primarily down party lines, with a mainly democrat
opposition.
136S. REP. No. 109-14, at 24 (2005).
'"See Judicial Conference of the U.S. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, at 39
(1990) (where the committee found that because of the changes in both commerce and the state
court systems since the Judiciary Act of 1789, diversity jurisdiction should be either eliminated or
substantially curtailed).
3
1 Maimon Schwarzchild, Keeping It Private, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 677, 686 (2007).
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motions to dismiss, it makes more sense for the legislature to create a rule
that resolves some of the uncertainty.
B. The ProposedStatute
Over the last two years, Congress had been considering an amendment to
the removal statute that would address and clarify fraudulent joinder.' 39 On
February 25, 2016, the Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2015 was
approved by the House of Representatives less than five months after it was
introduced.' 4 0 The vote was 229 to 189, with the split basically on party
lines.141 The bill was then referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, and
the Senate finished the year without voting.1 42
In the fall of 2016, an identical bill was again introduced in the House
under the name of the Innocent Party Protection Act.1 43 This bill was passed
by the House without amendment on March 9, 2017, with a vote of 224 to
194. 144 Once again the bill was received by the Senate and referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, which has yet to conduct a vote on it.1 4 5
The proposed bill would amend 28 U.S.C. § 1447146 by adding a new
subsection (f):
(f)

FRAUDULENT JOINDER.

(1) This subsection shall apply to any case in
which(A) a civil action is removed solely on the
basis of the jurisdiction conferred by section
1332(a);

1'162 CONG. REC. H913-15 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2016) (considering an amendment to H.R.
3624).
140 H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. (2016).
141 Id.; Hellman, supra note 22, at 34.
142 E. Farish Percy, The FraudulentJoinder Prevention Act of 2016: Moving the Law in the
Wrong Direction, 62 VILL. L. REV. 213, 214 n.8 (2017) [hereinafter Percy, FraudulentJoinder
PreventionAct]; Hellman, supra note 22, at 34.
143 H.R. 725, 115th Cong. (2017).
1441d.
45

1

d.

146Id.
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(B) a motion to remand is made on the
ground that(i) one or more defendants are
citizens of the same State as one or
more plaintiffs; or
(ii) one or more defendants
properly joined and served are
citizens of the State in which the
action was brought; 14 7 and
(C) the motion is opposed on the ground that
the joinder of the defendant or defendants
described in subparagraph (B) is fraudulent.
(2) The joinder of a defendant described in
paragraph (1)(B) is fraudulent if the court finds that:
(A) there is actual fraud in the pleading of
jurisdictional facts with respect to that
defendant;
(B) based on the complaint and the
materials submitted under paragraph (3), it
is not plausible to conclude that applicable
State law would impose liability on that
defendant;
(C) State or Federal law clearly bars all
claims in the complaint against that
defendant; or
(D) objective evidence clearly demonstrates
that there is no good faith intention to
prosecute the action against that defendant
or to seek a joint judgment including that
defendant.

147Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 115-17, at 7-8 (2017). This provision was added to ensure that
fraudulent joinder is not used to exploit the requirement of § 1441 (b)(2) that a case may not be
removed if the defendant is a citizen of the forum state where the lawsuit is being brought.
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(3) In determining whether to grant or deny a motion
under paragraph (1)(B) the court may permit the
pleadings to be amended, and shall consider the
pleadings, affidavits, and other evidence submitted
by the parties.
(4) If the court finds that all defendants described in
paragraph (1)(B) have been fraudulently joined
under paragraph (2), it shall dismiss without
prejudice the claims against those defendants and
shall deny the motion described in paragraph
(1)(B). 148
The arguments within the House for and against the bill fell into the basic
rationales for either broadening or diminishing diversity jurisdiction.
Supporters of the bill argued that it ensures that defendants are not deprived
of their right to a non-biased federal forum and that it enables "our court
system to operate with the impartiality Americans both expect and
deserve."l49 In calling the present system both flawed and allowing for
litigation abuse, one representative noted that the Fourth Circuit had
"practically apologized" to a nominal party whose addition to the lawsuit
prevented removal to federal court, explaining that the current fraudulent
joinder standard made it impossible to remove the case despite the fact that
the claims against the non-diverse party were practically certain to be
dismissed in state court. "o In addition, supporters of the bill emphasized that
the current uncertainty about the standard negatively impacts small business
who have "a target painted on their backs by lawyers who want to exploit
them to avoid having their case heard in federal court."'
These non-diverse small business owners and other nominal parties are
forced to spend money litigating when they are eventually dropped from the
14 8

d

Release, Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy, House Passes Reforms for an Impartial
Court System (Feb. 25, 2016).
50162 CONG. REC. H909 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2016) (quoting J. Harvie Wilkinson of the 4th
Cir.) ("You have to establish that the joinder of a nondiverse defendant is totally ridiculous and that
there's no possibility of ever recovering .... That is very hard to do. So I think that making the
fraudulent joinder law a little bit more realistic appeals ... to me because it seems to me the kind
of intermediate step that addresses some real problems.").
.s. Jessica Karmasek, US. House PanelApproves FraudulentJoinderBill, LEGAL NEWS LINE
(Feb. 3, 2016, 1:16 PM), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510661439-u-s-house-panel-approvesfraudulent-joinder-bill.
14Press
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lawsuit once it is argued on its merits.' 52 This is a novel rationale that has not
been part of the growing case law, 153 and it seems to be a way to counter the
argument that a less stringent standard only supports big business.
Those opposed to the bill expressed concern that the amendment would
clog the federal court docket by creating an overly complicated procedure to
determine whether removal is proper.1 54 The President of the American
Association for Justice described the bill as "destroying 100 years of
precedent for no reason" and warned that the Senate should "not grant
corporations the right to forum shop when Americans seek to hold them
accountable for wrongdoing."' 55 There were also concerns about the financial
impact on the federal courts and the lack of funding to support the changes. 156
C. Analysis of the ProposedStatute
Whenever Congress seeks to codify a court-created doctrine, the
legislation generally moves the law in one direction or another. This bill
seeks to establish a somewhat more robust version of the fraudulent joinder
doctrine than is generally applied by the majority of the courts,'15 generally
making it easier for courts to find fraudulent joinder and not remand the case
back to state court. The bill allows for greater discretion through the
elimination of the "common defense" rule,' 5 ' the use of the plausibility
standard, ' and the consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine whether
a party has been joined in bad faith.' 60
As drafted, Section 1 of the bill specifies the class of cases in which courts
can apply the standard discussed in the second paragraph.1 6 ' The heart of the

152 See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Ken Buck, Ken Buck's Bill to Protect Small Bus.
Passes the House (Feb. 25, 2016) (on file with author).
153Hellman, supra note 22, at 23.
54
1 Press Release, The Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer, H.R. 3624-Fraudulent Joinder
Prevention Act of 2015 (Feb. 25, 2016).
"'Press Release, American Association for Justice, AAJ Statement on House Passage of Corp.
Forum Shopping Bill (Feb. 25, 2016) (on file with author).
56
1 Letter from Center for Justice and Democracy, to Hon. Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2016) (on file with author).
15 Percy, FraudulentJoinderPreventionAct, supra note 142, at 214.
.. sId. at 244; H.R. REP. No. 114-422, at 14 (2016).
59
1 Percy, FraudulentJoinderPreventionAct, supra note 142, at 216; Hellman, supra note 22,
at 42.
"nPercy, FraudulentJoinderPrevention Act, supra note 142, at 226.
161 H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. § 2(f)(1) (2016).
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bill is in Section 2, which sets forth four criteria that define fraudulent
joinder. 16 2 Section 3 describes what evidence the court can use to analyze the
issue, and Section 4 explains what the court should do once it finds fraudulent
joinder. 163
Specifically, Section 1 of the bill limits it to cases where removal is based
on original diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiff moves to remand the case back
to state court, and the diverse defendant objects to the remand on the grounds
that the non-diverse defendant was fraudulently joined. 6 4 This defines the
class of cases in which the courts should apply the standards outlined in
Section 2 and codifies the class of cases that the courts have consistently
analyzed.165
Section 2 of the bill sets forth the criteria that the federal court should use
in order to determine if the removing defendant has satisfied her burden of
demonstrating fraudulent joinder. Prongs (A) and (D) codify current case
law. 166 Under prong (A), joinder is fraudulent if there is actual fraud in the
pleading of jurisdictional facts.'16 This is a non-controversial rationale,
although it is rarely the basis for finding fraudulent joinder.1 68
Under prong (D), joinder is fraudulent if objective evidence makes it clear
that there is no good faith intent to seek a judgment against the defendant.1 69
Again, this is taken directly from case law, and it is rarely the basis for finding

62

1 1d.

§ 2(f)(2).
16 Finally, under paragraph (4), the court is instructed to dismiss the fraudulently joined
defendants without prejudice. Percy, FraudulentJoinder Prevention Act, supra note 142, at 22627. This is in line with all of the circuit courts except for the Seventh Circuit, which issued its ruling
in a single sentence without explanation. Walton v. Bayer Corp., 643 F.3d 994, 1001 (7th Cir. 2011).
'1H.R. 3624 § 2(f)(1).
165 Percy, FraudulentJoinder PreventionAct, supra note 142, at 224.
"Id. at 225, 249.
167Id. at 251.
16
1d. at 251-52. Few courts have addressed fraudulent joinder based on actual fraud in the
pleading of jurisdictional facts. The doctrine is typically referred to as an actual or outright fraud in
the pleadings. Coffman v. Dole Fresh Fruit Co., 927 F. Supp. 2d 427, 434-35 (E.D. Tex. 2013). See
Cuevas v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 648 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 2011) (actual fraud);
Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (actual fraud); Great Plains
Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) (outright fraud);
Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 179 (5th Cir. 2000) (outright fraud); Jernigan v. Ashland
Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993) (outright fraud).
169 H.R. REP. No. 114-422, at 2 (2016).
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fraudulent joinder.1 70 For example, in Faulk v. Husqvarna Consumer
Outdoor ProductsN.A., Inc., the plaintiff brought an action in Alabama state
court against Husqvarna (successor in interest to Electrolux and a citizen of
Delaware and North Carolina) and his cousin (the non-diverse defendant,
also a citizen of Alabama), alleging that a lawn mower that was manufactured
by Electrolux and sold to him by his cousin was defective.' 7 1 The defendant
corporation removed the case almost nine months after it was served; at that
time, the plaintiff had not yet served his cousin.1 72 As a result, the defendant
corporation alleged that his citizenship should be ignored because he was
fraudulently joined.1 73 The court agreed, holding that the plaintiff's course of
conduct unequivocally demonstrated a voluntary abandonment of his claims
against his cousin and that the plaintiff lacked a good faith intention to pursue
his claims against his cousin. 7 4 As a result, the plaintiff s motion to remand
the case back to state court was denied.' 7 1
Prong (C) represents a shift in the case law and addresses two different
issues-whether courts can consider potential affirmative defenses, and
whether the "common defense" rule should be abrogated. With respect to
affirmative defenses, under that prong a court should find fraudulent joinder
if either state or federal law bars all claims in the complaint against the nondiverse defendant. As a result, the court must consider a viable affirmative
defense as a basis for finding fraudulent joinder. 76 1While some courts have
taken that position,177 others have taken the position that affirmative
defenses, especially federal ones, cannot be the basis for finding fraudulent
joinder.1 78 The courts that have rejected that view have done so on the basis
that the determination of fraudulent joinder must be made on the basis of the
17 0 ln re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 216 (3rd Cir. 2006) (citing Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
770 F.2d 26, 32 (3rd Cir. 1985)); see also Faulk v. Husqvarna Consumer Outdoor Prods., N.A., Inc.,
849 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 2012); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d
414, 414 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
171 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
72

1

173

d.

1d.
174
Id. at 1331.
17

1 Id.
76

at 1328.

1 See H.R. 3624, 1 14 th Cong.

§ 2(f)(2)(C)

(2016).

177 Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig., 905 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
17 8
City of Columbus v. Sunstar Columbus, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1864, 2015 WL 5775532, at *5
(S.D. Ohio 2015); Vincent v. First Republic Bank, Inc., No. C 10-01212 WHA, 2010 WL 1980223,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2010); Percy, FraudulentJoinderPreventionAct, supra note 142, at 243.
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plaintiffs complaint, and therefore potential affirmative defenses cannot be
considered.' 79
So, for example, in In re Briscoe, the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of the plaintiffs motion to remand the case back to state court
because it was clear that the plaintiffs complaint against the non-diverse
defendant was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.s0 Yet, in
Freitasv. McKesson Corp., the court would not consider whether the claims
against the defendant were preempted by federal law because a preemption
defense would go toward the merits of the claim, and ultimately remanded
the case back to state court.' ' Prong (C) resolves the disagreement between
the courts by expressly allowing the courts to consider affirmative
defenses.' 82 As the courts themselves have warned, however, "the district
court must rule out any possibility that a state court would entertain the
cause"1 83 and make sure that it does not cross the line from a "threshold
jurisdictional issue into a decision on the merits."' 8 4
The second thing that Prong (C) does is to abrogate the "common
defense" rule by limiting the court's inquiry to the non-diverse defendant
when determining whether a defense bars the claim."' In Smallwood v.
Illinois Central. Railroad Co. the plaintiff brought an action for negligence
in state court against both the railroad and the state agency that controlled the
railroad crossing.' 86 The railroad removed the case to federal court, alleging

17 City of Columbus, 2015 WL 5775532, at *5 ("In deciding whether diversity jurisdiction
exists here, the court's task is limited to determining whether the complaint states any claim that is
even arguably permitted under state law.").
"oSee 448 F.3d 201, 219 (3rd Cir. 2006); see also Johnson, 781 F.3d at 693 (affirming district
court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand after determining that plaintiffs claim against the
non-diverse defendant was preempted by the Communications Act); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 218.
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a determination of whether there is federal question
jurisdiction is based on an examination of the well-pleaded complaint, and potential defenses cannot
be taken into consideration. Since fraudulent joinder exists when a plaintiff fraudulently joins a cocitizen defendant, and therefore attempts to defeat diversity jurisdiction, this argument does not
make sense.
"' No. C 11-05967 JW, 2012 WL 161211, at *1, *16 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 10, 2012).
182 Percy, FraudulentJoinderPrevention Act, supra note 142, at 243.
1ln re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 219 (quoting Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d
Cir. 1992)).
'4Id. (quoting Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990)).

" H.R. REP. No. 114-422, at 14 (2016); see also Percy, FraudulentJoinderPrevention Act,
supra note 142, at 247.
i86385 F.3d 568, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2004).
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that the plaintiffs claims against the state agency were preempted and,
therefore, the plaintiff could not recover against either defendant. 1 7 The
district court agreed that the claims against the state agency were preempted,
which effectively decided the whole case, and, therefore, did not remand the
case back to state court.' The Fifth Circuit reversed en banc, holding that
because the railroad did not demonstrate that the state agency's joinder was
fraudulent, but only that the plaintiff could not recover against either
defendant, the district court did not have the power to dismiss the case on its
ments.' 89 The court concluded that if the only justification for fraudulent
joinder is that there is no reasonable basis for predicting recovery against the
non-diverse defendant, and that showing is equally dispositive of all of the
defendants rather than just the non-diverse defendant, then the defendant has
not met its burden to show that the non-diverse defendant was fraudulently
joined.' 90 That analysis has come to be known as the "common defense" rule.
The Smallwood court itself noted the paradox created by the common
defense rule.' 91 To remain in the federal forum, as is their wish, the diverse
defendants must effectively argue that the theory of liability that failed
against the non-diverse defendant could work, at least in theory, against them.
All the while, they must be careful not to preclude any later arguments they
may want to make.192 Conversely, the plaintiff must argue that his claims are
equally meritless as to all defendants in order to convince the court to remand
the case back to state court.1 9 3 Ultimately, the court is forced to theorize a
possible outcome based on hypothetical examples and incomplete evidence.
And it puts all of the parties in the unenviable position of arguing contrary to
their interests while running the risk of making judicial admissions that could
haunt them later.' 94
Yet, the common defense rule has been consistently applied by the
courts.' 9 5 The rationale is that common defenses are actually attacks on the
7

" Id. at 572.
-Id. at 571-72:
'90Id. at 583 (Jolly, J., dissenting); see also Frisby v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 500 F. Supp.
2d 697, 700 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
"' Frisby, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
1

92

93

1

Id.

ld.

194Id.
9 See, e.g., Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 568 (5th Cir. 2004); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913
F.2d 108, 113 (3rd Cir. 1990); see also McKinnes v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1254,
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merits of the case because they undermine the claims against the diverse and
non-diverse defendants alike.' 96 Put another way, because the common
defenses are not unique to the non-diverse defendant, they do not support an
argument that the non-diverse defendant was fraudulently joined.' 97 The
courts that have not used the common defense rule have not rejected it, but
have found that it does not apply because the claim against the diverse
defendant is analytically distinct from and in addition to the claims against
the non-diverse defendant and, therefore, the failure of the claims against the
non-diverse defendant does not necessarily cause the claims against the
diverse defendant to fail.' 98
Under the proposed language of the bill, if there is no viable claim against
the non-diverse defendant, the case should not be remanded to state court
even if that same defense could be used against the removing defendant. 99
The possibility that the same arguments might bar the claims against the
diverse defendant play no role at the jurisdictional stage. This position is a
clear deviation from the common law.
Doing away with the common defense rule raises serious federalism
concerns.2 00 in every case in which a federal court is asked to find fraudulent
joinder on grounds that are dispositive of the liability of diverse and nondiverse defendants alike, the court is being asked to exercise jurisdiction that
it does not possess.2 0
1259 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 13, 2006); In re New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 324 F.
Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D. Mass. 2004).
96
1 Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 571.
'9 McKinnes, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.
'"See Boone v. Citigroup, Inc., 416 F.3d 382, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2005); McKinnes, 420 F. Supp.
2d at 1258; Rainwater v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 636, 638 (5th Cir. 2004); Hauck v.
ConocoPhillips Co., No. 06-135-GPM, 2006 WL 1596826, at *9 (S.D. Ill. June 6, 2006).
'"Hellman, supra note 22, at 38; Percy, FraudulentJoinderPrevention Act, supra note 142,
at 226.
2
0 Percy, FraudulentJoinder PreventionAct, supra note 142, at 246-47.
20 1
See also Mannsfeld v. Evonik Degussa Corp., No. 10-0553-WS-M, 2011 WL 53098 at *2
(S.D. Ala. Jan. 5, 2011); Dominick's Finer Foods v. Nat. Const. Servs., Inc., No. CV 10-00836SVW (PWJx), 2010 WL 891321, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9,2010) (where fraudulent joinder allegation
is actually an attack on merits of plaintiffs entire case as to all defendants, a finding of fraudulent
joinder for diversity purposes would be improper because it is a merits-based decision that
effectively decides entire case); In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices and
Prods. Liab. Litig., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034 (S.D. Ill. 2010) ("[T]he common defense doctrine
provides that when the same argument or defense defeats a plaintiff's claim against diverse and nondiverse defendants that argument or defense may not be the basis for a fraudulent joinder finding.");
Feldman v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. CV 409-004, 2009 WL 2486899, at *4 n.6 (S.D. Ga.
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The diverse defendants really are just arguing that the suit has no merit,
and that is not a ground for removal, but for asking the court in which the suit
was filed-the state court-to dismiss the suit. While this shift makes it
easier for the defendant to satisfy its burden of demonstrating fraudulent
joinder, the federalism concerns outweigh the need for clarity.2 0 2
The most controversial change to the current case law is found in Prong
(B) of the bill. Under that prong, in considering whether there is fraudulent
joinder, the court must determine whether the plaintiffs cause of action
against the non-diverse defendant is plausible. 20 3 In making that assessment,
the court may pierce the pleadings and can consider amended pleadings,
affidavits, and any other evidence submitted by the parties. 2 0 Therefore,
Aug. 10, 2009) (pursuant to common defense rule, declining to find fraudulent joinder based on
statute of limitations defense that would bar claims against resident and non-resident defendants
alike); Loop v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of North Am., No. 09-0007-M, 2009 WL 981988, at *5 (S.D.
Ala. Apr. 13, 2009) ("[W]hen a fraudulent joinder defense would eliminate not only the claims
against a single defendant, but . .. all claims against all defendants, then the common defense rule
requires that the federal court reject the fraudulent joinder arguments and remand the removed
action back to the State courts for appropriate action."); Cherry v. AIG Sun Am. Life Assur. Co.,
No. 1:07-CV-923-MEF, 2008 WL 508428, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2008) ("The common defense
rule provides that when a defense to liability is common to diverse and non-diverse defendants,
fraudulent joinder cannot be found... . [T]hese attacks on the joinder of the non-diverse defendant
are in reality attacks on the merits of the entire case because they undermine the claims against both
the diverse and non-diverse defendants."); Poole v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1117
(M.D. Ala. 2006) (explaining that numerous courts "have applied a 'common defense rule' to
fraudulent-joinder claims such that when a defense to liability is common to diverse and non-diverse
defendants, fraudulent joinder is not found" for the reason that "common defenses are actually
attacks on the merits of the entire case since they undermine the claims against the diverse and nondiverse defendants alike"); Hauck, 2006 WL 1596826 at *9 ("It is this Court's view that, in every
case in which a federal court is asked to find fraudulent joinder on grounds dispositive of the liability
of diverse and non-diverse defendants alike, the court is being asked to exercise jurisdiction it does
not possess."); McGinty v. Player, 396 F. Supp. 2d 593, 601 (D. Md. 2005) (applying common
defense rule to deem non-diverse defendant not fraudulently joined where limitations defense was
equally applicable to claims against diverse defendant); In re New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales
Practices Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 288, 306 (D. Mass. 2004) ("[I]f an argument offered to prove
fraudulent joinder of non-diverse defendants also shows that no case exists against the diverse
defendants, no legitimate reasons exist to set apart the non-diverse defendants as fraudulently
joined.").
202 Percy, Defining the Contours, supra note 36, at 621.
20 3
See H.R. 725, 115th Cong. (2017).
2
0See Monahan, supra note 15, at 1350 (explaining that the federal courts may "pierce the
pleadings to determine whether a plaintiff has a legitimate claim against the diversity-destroying
defendant"); Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 462-63 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[D]istrict court may
'pierce the pleadings.').

2018]

HOGAN VS. GA WKER H

35

while the removing defendant still has the burden of proving fraudulent
joinder by clear and convincing evidence, it only has to demonstrate that the
plaintiff s cause of action against the non-diverse defendant is not plausible.
Thus the statute replaces standards like "no possibility of recovery," "no
reasonable basis," and "no reasonable possibility of recovery" with the
standard of plausibility, drawing the language from the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.20 5
The Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal2 06 heightened the
pleading standard from "no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief' 2 07 to "facts that give rise to a plausible entitlement to
relief' to defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 2 08 These opinions
have sparked debate and controversy throughout the legal community, with
concerns that the new standard would undermine meritorious claims,
especially for plaintiffs who frequently lack access to the courts or funds.209
Over the years since the cases were decided, courts have continued to be
confused over what the standard is and how and when it should be applied.2 10
Therefore, while the advocates of the bill claim that the plausibility standard
is "well understood by federal judges and will not create new litigation or
confusion," this is not the case. 2 11
Proponents of the bill also argue that requiring the plausibility standard is
"a modest tweak to the standard for fraudulent joinder." 2 12 This is also not
the case. While the language varies from circuit to circuit, almost all courts
currently employ a more lax standard in assessing a plaintiff s complaint for
the purposes of determining whether there is fraudulent joinder.2 13 Courts
20 5

H.R. REP. No. 114-422, at 12-13 (2016); Percy, Federal Case, supra note 16, at 216-17.
"Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
20 7
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
208
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
20 9
See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1621,
1627-28 (2012); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,60 DUKE L. J. 1, 16 (2010); Adam N. Steinman, The PleadingProblem,
62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1350-51 (2010).
2 10
Steinman, supra note 209, at 1299.
21 1
FraudulentJoinder PreventionAct of2015: Hearingon HR. 3621 Before the Subcomm. On
the Constitutionand Civil Justice ofthe H. Comm. On Judiciary, 114th Cong. 46 (2015) (statement
of Cary Silverman, partner at Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P.).
212
See id. at 35 (statement of Cary Silverman).
21 3
See Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) ("The plausibility
standard 'asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.' In contrast,
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that have considered fraudulent joinder since the Supreme Court's decision
in Twombly and Iqbal have continued that trend. For example, in Deweese v.
Doran, the court held that the pleading standard in deciding a charge of
fraudulent joinder is different from the plausibility standard applicable to a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 214 and that under its lesser standard "[i]f there is
even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a
cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court
must find that joinder was proper and remand the case to state court."2 15
Similarly, in determining whether the plaintiffs had established a cause
of action against the non-diverse defendants, the removing defendants argued
in Bellman that the court should consider the removal standard "in
conjunction with the . .. Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence regarding the
viability of complaints under a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis." 216 The defendants
argued that the court should find fraudulent joinder if it concludes that the
plaintiffs' claims against the non-diverse defendant do not "cross the line
from conceivable to plausible," reasoning that, if a "'conceivable' claim is
deemed insufficient under a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, then a theoretically
'possible' claim should be equally infirm under a remand analysis." 217 The
court disagreed, holding that the analysis for determining whether a motion

all that is required to defeat a fraudulent joinder claim is 'a possibility of stating a valid cause of
action."' (quoting Triggs v. John Crumo Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)));
Watson v. Gish, No. C 10-03770 SBA, 2011 WL 2160924, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2011);
Tofighbakhsh v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 10-830 SC, 2010 WL 2486412, at *1, 3 (N.D. Cal. June
16, 2010); Edwea, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. H-10-2970, 2010 WL 5099607, at *1, 5

(S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2010).
2 14

No. 3:15-cv-32-J-32JRK, 2015 WL 5772156, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2015) (citing
Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1332).
2 15
1d. at *5 (citing Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (1lth Cir. 1997)); see also Allard
v. Laroya, 163 F. Supp. 3d 309, 311, 311 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2016) ("'The party alleging fraudulent
joinder bears a heavy burden,' as it must show that there is 'no possibility' that the plaintiff would
be able to establish a claim even after resolving all issues of law and fact in the plaintiffs favor....
'This standard is even more favorable to the plaintiff than the standard for ruling on a motion to
dismiss . . . . Once the court identifies a glimmer of hope for the plaintiff the jurisdictional inquiry
ends."' (quoting Hartley v. CSX Transp., 187 F.3d 422, 422 (4th Cir. 1999))). And as noted by the
Allard court, at the time Hartley was decided, the standard had not yet been changed from possibility
to plausibility, and the court still felt that the fraudulent joinder standard was more lenient than the
old 12(b)(6) standard.
2 16
Bellman v. NXP Semiconductors USA, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1096 (D.N.M. 2017).
2 11
1d. at 1132.
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to dismiss should be granted and whether a non-diverse defendant was
fraudulently joined is not the same.2 18
In addition to going against established precedent, the proposed prong
overlooks key distinctions between Rule 12(b)(6) and fraudulent joinder.
First, even if a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), courts are
not confined to the allegations that appear on a complaint's face when
evaluating whether a plaintiff has fraudulently joined a non-diverse
defendant to defeat removal. 219 Rather, "upon allegations of fraudulent
joinder designed to prevent removal, [most courts] may look beyond the
pleadings to determine if the joinder, although fair on its face, is a sham or
fraudulent device to prevent removal." 22 0 The proposed prong itself allows
the court to pierce the pleadings and consider amended pleadings, affidavits,
and any other evidence submitted by the parties. 2 21 Thus, it is immaterial for
fraudulent joinder purposes whether the complaint "sets forth a litany of
labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations," 22 2 as the court is empowered
to look beyond the complaint's face to determine whether the plaintiffs would
be able to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant.223
Second, the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard is inappropriate because
it involves different burdens and requires a lesser quantum of proof than
fraudulent joinder's no-possibility standard. The fraudulent joinder test "is
more exacting than that for dismissing a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)."224 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must state a "plausible claim
for relief," which is "more than a sheer possibility," but less than a
"'probability requirement.' 225 In evaluating plausibility, a court must
construe the complaint's allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and dismiss a claim "only if a reasonable person could not draw . .. an
2 18

1Id. at 1114.

2 19

Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
2 20
Brazell v. Waite, 525 F. App'x 878, 881 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Smoot v. Chi., Rock
Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 881-82 (10th Cir. 1967)).
221 Bellman, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 1112.
222
Id. at 1132.
22 3

Zufelt v. Isuzu Motors Am., L.C.C., 727 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (D.N.M. 2009) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
24
2 Montano v. Allstate Indemn., No. 99-2225, 2000 WL 525592, at *1 (10th Cir. April 14,
2000). See Tr. at 21:8-20 (Hardy) (agreeing that the cases involving fraudulent joinder hold that the
standard is "higher than the standard on the motion to dismiss").
22 5
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678, 678 (2009).
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inference [of plausibility] from the alleged facts." 226 Proving a "sheer
possibility" is, of course, simpler than proving "plausibility." That, however,
is the point. Fraudulent joinder requires that the defendant prove that "there
is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action"
against the non-diverse party.227 The defendant therefore bears the "heavy
burden" of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims cannot meet the simpler
"possibility" standard, while the court, as in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, must
2 28
still resolve "all factual and legal issues . . . in favor of the plaintiff."
Moreover, in contrast with Rule 12(b)(6), the defendant must overcome a
presumption against removal,229 while the court may look beyond the
pleadings to determine whether a "possibly viable" claim exists.23 0 Finally,
where the court should dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) "only if a
reasonable person could not draw" an inference of plausibility, 231 a removing
defendant must establish a claim's impossibility for fraudulent joinder
purposes "with complete certainty upon undisputed evidence."232
Third, from a mechanical standpoint, the Twombly/Iqbal standard would
not work well in the fraudulent joinder context. Many state courts have not
adopted Twombly/Iqbal's heightened pleading standard.233 Instead, many
states continue to use notice pleading, which requires that plaintiffs allege
facts sufficient only to put the defendant on fair notice of their claims.234 A
complaint filed in state court is thus subject to a relaxed pleading standard;

22 6

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 317 (2007).
Zufelt, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
22
8Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); Montano, 2000
WL 525592, at *1 (stating that the court must "initially resolve all disputed questions of fact and all
ambiguities in the controlling law in favor of the non-removing party") (citation omitted).
229
See Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Simons, supra
note 16, at 625 n.139 (citing Balberdi v. Lewis, No.12-00582, 2013 WL 1296286, at *2 (D. Haw.
Mar. 8, 2013) (noting the strong presumption against removal and against a finding of fraudulent
joinder)).
230
Archuleta v. Taos Living Ctr., LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 (D.N.M. 2011); Montano,
2000 WL 525592, at *2.
231 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 317.
2 32
Smoot v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir., 1967).
2 33
Isengard v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't, No. CIV 08-0300 JB/RLP, 2009 WL 5220371, at *5
(D.N.M. 2009) ("Courts in New Mexico have not adopted the pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that the Supreme Court ... enunciated in [Twombly/1qbal.]").
23 4
See Taylor v. L&P Bldg. Supply of Las Cruces, Inc., No. CIV 14-0989 JB/CG, 2015 WL
7803614, at *12 n.5 (D.N.M. Oct. 27, 2015) (citing Rule 1-008(A) NMRA); Schmitz v.
Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726, 729-30 (N.M. 1990).
2 27
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once the case is removed to federal court, however, the complaint is subject
to the more rigorous Twombly/Iqbal standard. 235 Thus, while a complaint
crafted to meet the state's notice pleading standard may survive a motion to
dismiss in that forum, upon removal it might fail to state a claim under the
more rigorous federal standard.
A solution proposed by the bill is that the complaint can be dismissed
without prejudice to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their
complaint to comply with Twombly/Iqbal.236 This process, however, does not
work in the fraudulent joinder context, where the central question is whether
the case belongs in federal court in the first place. If the court's remand
analysis is confined to the complaint's four corners, and a plaintiff had
additional evidence to offer, fairness would require that the court allow
amendment before determining whether the complaint-originally drafted to
comply with state notice-pleading-met Twombly/Iqbal's heightened
pleading standard. Such a process would waste judicial resources, unduly
delay resolution of the matter, and incentivize formalistic pleading practice.
Thus, in addressing whether a non-diverse party was fraudulently joined,
the federal court should not apply the same standard that it must apply in
addressing a motion to dismiss. Plausibility should not be the test for
fraudulent joinder. The plausibility standard itself is confusing, and the bill's
proposal contravenes the courts' long-established conclusion that fraudulent
joinder requires that there is "no possibility" of a claim against the nondiverse defendant. The "no possibility" test carries a heavier burden than
Rule 12(b)(6)'s plausibility standard because a "possible" claim is simpler to
establish than a "plausible" one. Finally, since many states continue to use
notice pleading, it is not appropriate to subject the complaint to a plausibility
analysis once it has been removed.237
Instead, when evaluating fraudulent joinder, the proper inquiry should be
whether a plaintiff can state a "possibly viable" claim. 238 "A claim is
235

See Taylor, 2015 WL 7803614 at *12 n.5 (citations omitted).
See H.R. 725, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Archuleta v. Taos Living Ctr., LLC, 791 F. Supp.
2d 1066, 1076 (D.N.M. 2011).
237
Paragraph (3) also allows the plaintiff to amend her pleadings. See H.R. 725, 115th Cong.
(2017). As the House Report explains, that language is designed to address the concern that "the
plaintiff, having filed a complaint in state court under state procedural rules, may not have
anticipated application of a . .. federal standard." H.R. REP. No. 115-17 (2017). If, however, the
plausibility standard is no longer used, then there is no need for that particular language. Id.
23
Montano v. Allstate Indemn., No. 99-2225, 2000 WL 525592, at *2 (10th Cir. April 14,
2000).
236

BAYLOR LAWREVIEW

40

[Vol. 70:1

'possibly viable' if with amendment it would state a cause of action." 23 9 Thus,
here, rather than requiring an amendment if the plaintiffs' claims against the
non-diverse defeiidant are not facially "plausible," the court can more
efficiently evaluate fraudulent joinder by inquiring whether there is a
possibility that any of the plaintiffs' claims against the non-diverse defendant
could be viable either in state court or in federal court under an amended
complaint.240 While the courts need flexibility, the rules for remand and not
just the rules for fraudulent joinder dictate a more stringent standard.24 1
Paragraph (3) allows the court to pierce the pleadings and consider
affidavits and other materials submitted by the parties.2 4 2 According to the
House Report, this bill anticipates a framework more similar to the one used
for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 than the
framework used for motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). 24 3 So while the bill advocates the same standard as a motion to
dismiss, it allows the use of extrinsic evidence to determine whether there is
fraudulent joinder. While some courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit, have
embraced the broad piercing of the pleadings, 24 many other courts have
determined that the court should go no further than the complaint.245
Allowing the court to look further than the pleadings makes sense. The
federal court must make a jurisdictional determination while not crossing the
threshold into a determination on the merits of the claim. Therefore, it is

239

Archuleta, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
1d. at 1076 ("The Court will thus determine whether there is a possibility that any of J.
Archuleta's claims against Reid are viable, either in state court, or in federal court under an amended
complaint.").
24 1
See Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 404 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[S]tatutes
conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts, and particularly removal statutes, are to be narrowly
construed in light of our constitutional role as limited tribunals.").
242 Percy, FederalCase, supra note 16, at
224.
243 H.R. REP. No. 114-422, at 16 (2017); Percy, FederalCase, supra note 16, at 239.
24 0

2
"See Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crowe v.
Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)) ("To determine whether the case should be
remanded the district court must evaluate the factual allegations in light most favorable to the
plaintiff .... [T]he federal court makes these determinations based on the plaintiffs pleadings at
the time of removal; but the court may consider affidavits and deposition transcripts submitted by
the parties.").
245
See Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2nd Cir. 1998); see also Poulos
v. NAAS Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir. 1992); Batoffv. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848,
851 (3rd Cir. 1992) ("In evaluating the alleged fraud, the district court must focus on the plaintiffs
complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed.").
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important for the court to have some flexibility with respect to the evidence
that it can review, but the extent that the court can pierce the pleadings should
be limited. As the Fifth Circuit stated, "Discovery by the parties should not
be allowed except on a tight judicial tether, sharply tailored to the question at
hand, and only after a showing of its necessity." 246 Therefore, this provision
needs further clarification and some limitations in order to make sure that the
fraudulent joinder analysis is balanced by the plaintiff s right to have a state
court determine the merits of the claim.
CONCLUSION
While it is important to have a statutory solution to the problem of
fraudulent joinder, the present bill needs some work. The partisan views of
plaintiffs preferring state court and defendants preferring federal court are
short-sighted and not helpful. The Hulk Hogan case is an example of a very
wealthy plaintiff whose lawsuit was also bankrolled by Peter Theil, a Silicon
Valley billionaire who had his own agenda against Gawker that was driven
by revenge over being "outed" by the media company.2 47 The underlying
issues that exist because of the uncertainty of the law continue to create
confusion and inconsistent results.
In addition, the rationale of the bill seems to rest on the unfairness to the
non-diverse defendant in having to defend itself from frivolous claims so that
the plaintiff can strategically avoid federal court, rather than the stated
purpose of diversity jurisdiction, which is to make sure that the diverse
defendant can litigate in a federal forum that is free from prejudice. 248 Even
if this is true, there seems to be no federal interest in protecting an individual
or small business from being sued by citizens of their own state in state court
on a state law cause of action. While there certainly is an expense involved
in defending itself, there is no empirical evidence to support the proposition
that the non-diverse defendant is dismissed as soon as the case is remanded
to state court.249
How does this leave Hulk Hogan?

24 6

Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R Co., 385 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2004).
247Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire,Reveals Secret War with Gawker, N.Y.
TIMES (May 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/business/dealbook/peter-thiel-techbillionaire-reveals-secret-war-with-gawker.html.
248
HelIlman, supra note 22, at 34-35.
249
1Id. at 42.
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If the bill were enacted as written, there is a good chance that the lawsuit
would not have been remanded to state court. Gawker was not asserting an
affirmative defense and there was no potential common defense problem, so
neither of those changes in the law would have impacted the result. The court
would have had to analyze the allegation of fraudulent joinder through a
plausibility standard, however, and would have been able to look beyond
Bollea's complaint when assessing whether he had a plausible entitlement to
relief from Heather Clem. It is possible that further information would have
supported the contention that the statute of limitations had run for each of the
five causes of action against Heather Clem. Or it is possible that other
information that came out during discovery could have made an impact on
the judge. Ultimately, while Bollea recovered $115 million from Gawker in
compensatory damages, and over $25 million in punitive damages, Heather
Clem was dropped from the lawsuit just before the damages were awarded.250
And if the case had proceeded in federal court, would the ultimate result
have been different? The applicable law would have been the same, although
Gawker would not have had to put up the whole amount of the award as bond
while waiting for the appeal.251 The jury would have been different, the judge
would have been different, and it is very possible that even if Gawker was
found to be liable, the award would not have been as large.2 52 As a result,
perhaps Gawker would still exist today.

25 0

Anna
Phillips
(@annamphillips),
TWITTER
(July
1,
2015,
2:47
PM),
http://live.tampabay.com/Event/HulkvsGawkLiveCoverage fromtheHulkHogan vsGawke
r_Trial?Page=0 (Tampa Bay Times writer Anna Phillips, tweeted "Attorney for Hulk Hogan says
they . . will drop her from the case against @Gawker."); Maria Bustillos, Everything You Need to
Know about Hulk Hogan v. Gawker, MOTHERBOARD (July 1, 2015), https://motherboard.vice.com/
enus/article/mgbyd8/hulk-hogans-sex-tape-is-about-to-go-to-trial-gawker.
25 1
See FED. R. Civ. P. 62; FLA. R. APP. P. 9.310
252 "State courts have a history of offering really, shall we say, inflated judgments. This was
one on steroids." John Cook, Former Executive Editor, Gawker Media Corp.

